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SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAIV-1955-1956
TRADE REGULATION
Almost sixty years ago, the Appellate Court for the First
District indicated, by way of dictum, that a trade mark could
not be conveyed in gross and might be transferred only with the
right to manufacture the product to which it was appurtenant.58
The apparent silence intervening since that decision has at last
been broken in Illinois by the case of Goodman v. Motor Products
Corporation.59 The same court there affirmed its earlier position
and promulgated a like rule with respect to trade names as well.
While recognizing that such intangibles may, for some purposes,
amount to property rights, the court, in both decisions, appears
to have been more strongly influenced by the deception which
could be practiced on the public if such transfers were tolerated.
VIII. TORTS
The outstanding decision in the law of torts, that of Nudd
v. Matsoukas,1 produced two changes of consequence in the law
of Illinois. In one count of the complaint, a child, through his
next friend, sought to hold his father and a third party liable
for injuries sustained in an automobile accident between cars
driven by the defendants. In a separate count, predicated on a
prior wrongful death law,2 the father was charged with causing
the death of the mother of the same child. With respect to the
first count mentioned, the Supreme Court reversed its earlier
position 3 and held that an unemancipated minor could maintain
an action in tort against his parent, at least where such action
was predicated upon the wilful and wanton misconduct of the
parent.4 In reaching that conclusion, the court acknowledged,
58 The Fair v. Jose Morales & Co., 82 Ill. App. 499 (1899).
599 Ill. App. (2d) 57, 132 N. E. (2d) 356 (1956).
1 7 I1. (2d) 608, 131 N. E. (2d) 525 (1956), noted in 34 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REvIEw 333, 5 DePaul L. R. 302, 44 Ill. B. J. 840, and 42 Va. L. R. 687.
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 70, § 2.
3 See Hazel v. Hoopeston-Danville Motor Bus Co., 310 11. 38, 141 N. E. 393,
390 A. L. R. 491 (1923).
4 This allegation may well have been otherwise necessary because of Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 95 , § 58a, which denies recovery by a guest passenger
against a host driver in simple negligence cases.
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but did not explicitly accept or reject, the contention of the minor
plaintiff that the presence of automobile liability insurance re-
moved the only barrier to his suit. It should also be noted that,
with respect to both counts, the father had relinquished any
benefit he might derive from the claim of his injured son.5
With respect to the last mentioned count, the Supreme Court,
after noting the intervening change in the statutory law,6 held
that the negligence of a defendant-beneficiary does not bar a
wrongful death action on behalf of innocent beneficiaries. While
the impact of the decision on the specific point involved has
perhaps been tempered by the aforementioned statutory change,
the compelling reasons which produced this result might well
induce the court to override this barrier in actions other than
those for wrongful death.
A question concerning the duty of care owed by a carrier
to a transferring passenger provided the basis for another deci-
sion of the Supreme Court overruling prior law.7 In the case
of Rotheli v. Chicago Transit Authority,8 the court took the
position that the customary high degree of care owed by a carrier
was suspended while the passenger was transferring from one
of the defendant's vehicles to another. It therefore affirmed a
judgment against a passenger who had alighted safely from a
vehicle operated by the defendant and was then injured when
that vehicle started forward. There appeared to the court to be
no sufficient reason to distinguish between pedestrians on the
ground that one intended to board another of the carrier's vehi-
cles for the purpose of resuming his journey while another was
not so inclined.
5 Cf. Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Or. 282, 218 P. (2d) 445, 19 A. L. R. (2d) 405 (1950),
which was cited by the court even though its facts were substantially different
in that both the parent and the child had been killed in the accident.
6 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 70, § 2, as amended in 1955, now specifically
removes this impediment.
7 The case which was overruled is Feldman v. Chicago Railways Co., 289 Ill.
25, 124 N. E. 334 (1919).
87 Ill. (2d) 172, 130 N. E. (2d) 172 (1955), affirming 5 Ill. App. (2d) 190,
125 N. E. (2d) 283 (1955), noted in 34 CHCAGo-KENT LAw RzvlEw 249.
SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAIV-1955-1956
Two cases decided by the Appellate Court for the First
District are also deserving of mention in this survey. In the case
of Cereal Byproducts Company v. Hall,' a firm of certified public
accountants were held liable to the client for failure to confirm
a list of the client's accounts receivable. This result was achieved
despite the instructions of an employee of the client that the list
was not to be confirmed since said instructions were given without
the consent or knowledge of the officers of the client. A novel
factual situation was involved in the case of Stradford v. Reineke,10
wherein a defeated candidate for State Representative brought
an action to recover damages against the individual members of
the Board of Election Commissioners. The default with which
the defendants were charged was the destruction of ballots in
violation of their statutory duty" and thus preventing the plain-
tiff from contesting the election. The Appellate Court first con-
cluded that the statute imposed a duty on the defendants in favor
of the plaintiff as a defeated candidate and not merely as a
member of the public generally, and that the statute was sufficient
to impose civil liability. Although the statute was silent on the
subject of notice, the court nevertheless held for the defendants
on the ground that express notice must be given the Board of
Election Commissioners that an election contest has been filed
in order to assert that liability.12
98 Il1. App. (2d) 331, 132 N. E. (2d) 27 (1956), noted in 34 CHMCAGO-KENT
LAw Ravrnw 329. An appeal has been dismissed.
106 Ill. App. (2d) 537, 128 N. E. (2d) 588 (1955), noted in 34 CHmAGo-KsET
LAw Rlvmw 252.
11 111. Rev. Stat. 1947, Ch. 46, § 17-20 provides for the destruction of ballots
unless an election contest is then pending.
12 It may be noted that the statute has now been amended to authorize the
destruction of ballots unless an election contest is pending and the board has no-
tice thereof. ]il. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 46, § 17-20.
